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ABSTRACT 
  The purpose of this thesis is to give a comprehensive explanation of the 
worldwide trade and environment conflicts and a thorough analysis of the trade and 
environment debate between trade specialists and environmentalists. After a general 
introduction of the origin of and the critical issues involved in the trade and environment 
debate, this thesis discusses the complicated relation between trade and environment on 
the basis of economic theory and empirical studies. Then it examines the resolution of 
specific trade and environment conflicts within a multilateral trading system and the 
relative role of WTO in accommodating environmental interest into the trade 
liberalization. At last it comes to its conclusion that there is no inherent conflict between 
trade liberalization and environmental protection and trade and environment should go 
hand in hand to achieve a sustainable development and the improvement of human 
welfare as a whole. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The past decade has witnessed two different aspects of the development of human 
society: on the one hand, the blinding pace of economic growth all over the world created 
by the liberalization of trade on the one hand, and on the other, the dramatic degradation 
of environment on our planet in both international and national level, on the other. Not 
only the scope and the severity of them attract the worldwide attention, the complicated 
relation between international economy especially international trade and environmental 
protection has made “trade and environment” a hot topic in every aspect of human life. 
As a result, two camps, which are led by environmentalists and free traders respectively, 
and a trade and development debate between these two camps, have appeared. The main 
issue here is whether there is a fundamental conflict between trade liberalization and 
environmental protection, or put in another way, can the goal of trade liberalization be 
achieved without the sacrifice of environmental interests, or even benefiting 
environmental protection at the same time? This article serves as an effort to address this 
issue by a thorough analysis of the relation of trade and environment, and, in particular, 
the relative role of WTO as the leader of the trade regime. Chapter 1 gives a general 
introduction of the Trade and Environment debate; Chapter 2 addresses three critical 
questions about the relation between trade and environment involved in the debate and 
the possibility of their convergence; Chapter 3 discusses the role of WTO in 
accommodating environmental interests into the multilateral trading system by analyzing 
the key environment-related issues under WTO; Chapter 4 concludes that there is no 
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fundamental conflict between trade and environment, and WTO can help to achieve the 
goal of trade liberalization while maintaining or promoting environmental interests. 
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CHAPTER 1 
TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT DEBATE 
Origins of the trade and environment debate 
Trade and environment used to be two completely distinct worlds that developed on 
separate tracks and neither trade specialists nor environmentalists ever perceived their 
realms as interacting. The recent clash between trade and environment can be traced back 
to some newly developed social trends all over the world1: 
• Rising interest in the environment  
During the past several decades, more than two hundred multilateral environmental 
agreements have been created, governmental or non-governmental environmental 
organizations have spread to every corner of the world, while the number of 
environmentally conscious consumers also keeps growing. This dramatic rise of interest 
in the environment is, in part attribute to the increased social wealth, especially in 
developed countries, where the quality of life becomes more salient and at the same time 
people can afford a higher environmental standard. In addition, the increasing visibility of 
environmental problems, especially the occurrence of several of the most notorious 
environmental accidents such as the Exxon Valdez oil spill and the Chernobyl nuclear 
accident has extended this trend across the world, including some of the least developed 
countries. 
• Ecological interdependence 
                                                 
1 See DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE FUTURE, INSTITUTE FOR 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, Cha 1, 9-23, 1994. 
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In the field of environmental policy making, the interdependence of the ecological 
systems on the earth has been realized with the emergence of global environmental 
problems such as ozone depletion and climate change. Even a current local 
environmental problem, such as the loss of wetlands in China, will cause significant 
negative effect on the global environment in the near future. As a result, coordinated, 
multilateral environmental programs are required to address environmental problems. 
Thus, it has been more and more popular to use market-access or other trade measure in 
international environmental agreements to encourage broad participation. The best 
example would be the Montreal Protocol, which generally bans the trade of certain 
products with ozone depletion substances between members and nonmembers to protect 
the members from a potential competitive disadvantage in the international market of 
these products2. In addition, some countries such as the United States have begun to use 
trade measures unilaterally to affect the environmental policies in other countries3. This 
has got on the nerves of trade specialists, who fear the more and more common use of 
trade restrictions or penalties for an environmental purpose will impair the multilateral 
trade systems as well as the open and uniform world market, especially when 
environmental protection is used as an excuse for a disguised protectionism. 
• Economic interdependence 
Another factor that drives trade and environment together is the economic integration 
and interdependence among countries promoted by trade liberalization. The intensity of 
global competition makes one country’s own environmental policy an international 
                                                 
2 See DAVID HUNTER, JAMES SALZMAN & DURWOOD ZAELKE, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND 
POLICY, Cha 9, 544 (2nd ed. 2002). 
3 See Ilona Cheyne, Environmental Unilateralism and the WTO/GATT System, 24 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
433. 
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concern, since it may affect this country’s competitiveness in the world market. 
Environmentalists particularly fear the pressure from international competition will force 
governments to choose lax environmental standards with less cost to achieve a 
competitive advantage. 
The arguments in the trade-environment debate4 
A number of arguments from environmentalists suggest that trade liberalization 
constitutes a serious threat to the world environmental quality and protection: 
• Without environmental safeguards, trade may cause environmental harm by 
promoting economic growth that results in the unsustainable consumption of natural 
resources and waste production. 
• Trade liberalization enables pollution industries to move from countries with tough 
environmental standards to countries with lax environmental standards to reduce the costs 
of pollution abatement, which will increase the total amount of pollution all over the 
world. 
• Even if the pollution they cause does not spill over into other nations, countries with 
lax environmental standards have a competitive advantage in the global marketplace and 
put pressure on countries with high environmental standards to reduce the rigor of their 
environmental requirements, or feel reluctant to develop new environmental policies. 
• In practice, trade restrictions that should be available as leverage to promote 
worldwide environmental protection, particularly to address global or transboundary 
environmental problems and to reinforce international agreements have been limited or 
forbidden by trade rules and the multilateral trade regimes, led by WTO. 
                                                 
4 See ESTY, supra note 1, Cha 2, at 42; see also HUNTER, SALZMAN & ZAELKE, supra note 2, Cha 15, at 
1127. 
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As a response, trade specialists argue that: 
• International trade helps specialize the production of goods and services and 
maximize economies of scale, thus promoting the efficient use of natural resources with 
the force of international competition. 
• International trade promotes economic growth and wealth creation and thus 
generates the political demand and capacity for environmental protection, particularly in 
developing countries. 
• Increased commercial transactions among different nations and cultures driven by 
liberalized trade stimulate the sharing of experiences, policies, and ideas, which in turn 
stimulate the dissemination of environment-friendly technology and the public conscious 
of environmental problems. 
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                                             CHAPTER 2  
                  ANALYZING THE TRADE-ENVIRONMENT DEBATE: 
       THE COMPLICATED RELATION BETWEEN TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT 
In summary, the three key questions involved in the trade-environment debate are the 
following: first, whether economic integration through trade and investment constitutes a 
threat to the environment. Second, whether trade undermines the regulatory efforts of 
governments to control pollution and resource degradation. And third, whether economic 
growth driven by trade will simply result in a more unsustainable consumption all over 
the world, beyond the carrying capacity of our environment or, on the contrary, promote 
a sustainable use of the world environmental resources. 
Before addressing these questions, a brief review of the root causes of environmental 
degradation will be important so that we can know from where trade can affect the 
environment. Generally all the factors that speed up environmental degradation can be 
traced back to “market failures” and “policy failures”.5 
“Market Failures” refer to situations in which the market forces of supply and 
demand fail to deliver an optimal outcome for society as a whole, which commonly 
occurs when producers and consumers do not have to bear the full cost of their actions, or 
the property rights over resources are undefined6. An extreme example is the “tragedy of 
commons”, a phenomena in which open-access and ruleless resources are often exploited 
                                                 
5 See Hakan Nordstrom & Sott Vaughan, Special Studies 4: Trade and Environment, 13, WTO 
Publications, 1999, http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/environment_e.pdf.  
6 See id. 
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due to the market’s failing to reflect the scarcity of these resources through price signal7. 
Many environmental resources are “public goods” and thus continue to suffer the 
“tragedy of the commons”. Clean air, water, and especially marine resources such as 
whale stocks, are free for all but valued by no one.  
In some cases people can work out some conservation-cum-distribution scheme 
between themselves. For example, in the sheep hypothesis of Hardin, the shepherds may 
come together and issue some limit on the use of pastures and sanctions for overuse. 
Then the pastures may be maintained to a sustainable level.8 But when the given 
resources are diffuse or the people are too many or too difficult to organize, which is 
always the case in environmental problems, a market solution may not be possible and 
thus it’s up to the government to correct the market failure by proper environmental 
policies. However, chances are that governments may not omit to do so but may also add 
a few distortions of their own, which is described as “policy failure”9. 
Ideally, governments would use proper environmental policies, such as “polluter pays 
principle” to internalize the full environmental costs of production and consumption, and 
the market failure would be corrected directly at the source by appropriate tax and 
regulations. However, governments are not always responsive to their citizens’ welfare 
and values. In the real world, the environmental policies reflect the nature of the 
government and the influence of dominant economic or political factions. Some 
governments may be shortsighted, incompetent or even corrupt10 and thus fail to adopt 
                                                 
7 See HUNTER, SALZMAN & ZAELKE, supra note 2, Cha 3, at 127-129 (quoting GARRETT HARDIN, 
TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS, 168 Science 243 (1968)).  
8 See HUNTER, SALZMAN & ZAELKE, supra note 2, Cha 3, at 129 (quoting GARRETT HARDIN, TRAGEDY OF 
THE COMMONS, 168 Science 243 (1968)).  
9 See Nordstrom & Vaughan, supra note 5, at 14. 
10 See H. JEFFREY LEONARD, POLLUTION AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD PRODUCT, Cambridge 
University Press, 1988, at 226. 
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adequate laws or enforce them effectively. When this is the case, trade liberalization 
could exacerbate the consequences of poor environmental policies.11 For example, 
without scientific, efficient management of the natural resources within a nation, the 
competition pressure from the world market may encourage unsustainable fishing and 
logging and thus aggravate the degradation of natural resources. On the other hand, trade 
itself, as well as the environment, may suffer from policy failures such as fishing subsidy, 
which not only distorts international trade but also contributes to over-fishing. 
When trade interacts with market failures and policy failures, it affects the 
environment directly or indirectly. And it should be made clear that what we talk about 
here is whether there is a fundamental, inherent conflict between trade and environment. 
Trade and environment conflicts with each other everywhere and new trade and 
environment conflicts are on the horizon especially in the areas of intellectual property, 
subsidies, and trade in services. But do these conflicts attribute to some inherent 
negativity of trade against the environment, or attribute to some other factors such as 
inappropriate international or national policies or laws, which distort not only 
environment, but also trade? Now, we will discuss this issue around the three key 
questions mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. 
The effect of economic integration through trade on environment 
The worldwide economic integration through liberalized trade has significant and 
complicated effects on both the domestic and international market. One is the industrial 
restructuring that takes place when a country exposes itself to the world market, which is 
called “composition effect”12. After examining its comparative advantage and 
                                                 
11 See Nordstrom & Vaughan, supra note 5, at 26. 
12 See Nordstrom & Vaughan, supra note 5, at 29.  
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disadvantage, a country may choose to expand its export in some sectors or, on the 
contrary, to expand import in other sectors. Here trade is associated with a relocation of 
pollution problems around the world. It is always assumed by the environmentalists that 
polluting industries are likely to migrate from developed to developing countries to take 
advantage of lax regulations and therefore increase overall pollution in the world. 
However, this assumption does not seem to be supported by either trade theory or 
empirical evidence. For example, in a recent study, Birdsall and Wheeler13 examined 
changes in the pollution intensity of output in various industrial sectors in developing 
countries from 1960 through 1990 that had resulted from shifts in the sectoral 
composition of output in order to test the hypothesis that international trade in product 
and investment would lead to the migration of industry to less developed countries that 
tend to have less stringent environmental requirements. With this hypothesis, a faster 
growth in industrial pollution intensity should be expected in economies that are 
relatively open to trade (those with low trade barriers and few restrictions on capital 
flows) as opposed to those relatively closed economies. Contrary to their hypothesis, they 
found that the relatively closed economies were more pollution intensive. Another study 
examining direct investment by heavily regulated U.S. industries in facilities abroad 
found a small increase in such investment by the chemical and mineral processing 
industries from 1970-80, but this increase in heavily regulated industries’ investment in 
developing countries was no greater than that of U.S. industry as whole.14 
                                                 
13 See Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 
2039, 2077 (quoting Nancy Birdsall & David Wheeler, Trade Policy and Industrial Pollution in Latin 
America: Where Are the Pollution Havens? 159, 167). 
14 See id. at 2078 (quoting H. JEFFREY LEONARD, POLLUTION AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD 
PRODUCT, 94, 96). 
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Several factors may explain these findings. First, polluting industries tend to be 
capital-intensive industries such as chemicals, pulp and paper, and oil refining. 
Theoretically these industries are more likely to conglomerate in capital-abundant 
countries, which are usually developed or newly industrialized countries. Developing 
countries, on the contrary, are usually label-intensive.15 In addition, in decisions 
regarding the setting of new facilities, some traditional factors, such as raw material, 
access to markets, transportation, and general business climates tend to be more 
determinative than the differences in environmental standards.16 There are of course some 
exceptions, but data tells us that developed countries’ share of pollution countries has 
remained at about 75-80 percent in recent decades and has even increased slightly in the 
1990s.17 Even for those industries that have moved to developing countries, studies of 
industrial development in Chile, the fertilizer industry in Bangladesh, and steel 
manufacturing in developing countries have found that new industrial projects achieved 
much higher degrees of pollution control than legally required, some even comparable to 
those achieved in developed countries.18 This may reflect that, for many multilateral 
firms, it is less costly to duplicate the home technology than to modify the process in 
each country. 
On the other hand, the moving of pollution industries from countries with tougher 
environmental regulations to countries with comparatively laxer environmental 
regulations or standards may not be a bad thing for the environment if such differences in 
environmental standards among countries appropriately reflect the different assimilative 
                                                 
15 See Nordstrom & Vaughan, supra note 5, at 32. 
16 See Stewart, supra note 13, at 2077. 
17 See Nordstrom & Vaughan, supra note 5, at 32.  
18 See Stewart, supra note 13, at 2070. 
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capacities in those countries. A country’s capacity to assimilate pollution depends on its 
geographic, ecological, and demographic characteristics, which vary from one country to 
another.19 A country with fast-running, short rivers can assimilate a higher level of water 
pollution with less environmental harm than a country with slow-running, long rivers. 
Also, with a given level of air pollution, a large sparsely populated country will suffer 
adverse health and environmental effects than will a small, densely populated country.20 
As a result, when pollution industry moves from countries with lower assimilative 
capacity to countries with higher assimilative capacity, even if the total emission 
increases slightly, the actual environmental harm may be the same or even less. Thus as 
long as the environmental policy in a country reflects its assimilative capacity correctly, 
liberalized trade can help raise consumption without compromising the natural 
environment and therefore benefit the welfare of human beings and its environment as a 
whole. At least in this sense, there are no inherent conflicts between trade and 
environment.  
However, conflicts do arise when the political institutions in different countries fail to 
make appropriate environmental policies, regulations or standards that reflect their actual 
environment-carrying capacity in these countries. Then comes the second question, 
whether the pressure from international competition driven by a multilateral trade system 
will undermine environmental policies.  
The effect of liberalized trade on domestic environmental policies 
A classical critique from environmentalists against trade liberalization is that the 
globalization of the world economy promoted by trade makes industries more foot-loose 
                                                 
19 See id. at 2052. 
20 See Stewart, supra note 13, at 2052. 
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and more difficult to regulate, and at the same time, the governments, due to the pressure 
from international competition, tend to relax their current environmental standards, or at 
least are reluctant to develop new environmental policies in order to keep or increase 
their competitiveness in the international market. But against the assumption of 
environmentalists, the cost of environmental regulation does not seem to be enough to 
affect the competitiveness of a country significantly. For example, studies of the United 
States environmental regulation costs found that though compliance expenditures for 
pollution control are large in absolute terms, they represent an average of only .54% of 
total production costs for industry as a whole and from 1% to 3% for the most heavily 
regulated industries.21 It is questionable whether a regulatory cost-disadvantage of few 
percentage points will turn comparative advantage around. Also, the compliance costs are 
always overestimated since in practice the pressure from tough environmental regulations 
usually encourages industries to develop new technologies that reduce both the input of 
energy and resources and the pollution during the production process, thereby offsetting 
the direct compliance costs. For example, the costs of federal air and water pollution 
control in the United States for 1981, which was estimated by EPA at $42.5 billion, were 
only $28 billion when indirect effects such as the substitution effects that result in fewer 
purchases thus reducing output of products whose price has increased as a result of 
regulation were analyzed.22 Moreover, the cost of the environmental rules or standards 
with the same level of stringency may vary from one another due to the different policy 
instruments and legal and administrative approaches chosen to implement theses 
standards. Command-and-control regulations, like those used in the United States, are 
                                                 
21 See Stewart, supra note 13, 2062-2063. 
22 See id. 2066-2067, (quoting Michael Hazilla & Raymond J, Kopp, Social Cost of Environmental Quality 
Regulations: A General Equilibrium Analysis, 98 J. POL. ECON. 853 (1990), at 865). 
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considerably more costly than market-based instruments that allow producers greater 
flexibility. It has been found that compared to that in the United States (.28%), the 
adverse impact of environmental regulation on productivity in Japan, which has 
comparable stringent environmental standards, was quite small (.06%), due to the greater 
flexibility of the Japanese regulatory systems.23  
On the other hand, though it is that true stringent environmental regulations cost more 
than lax ones, they also bring significant benefit to society and the quality of life. Some 
may argue that many of the benefits of environmental regulation are nonpecuniary such 
as the enjoyment of clean air, and thus will not be taken into account in a government’s 
cost-benefit analysis for its choice of environmental policies. However, first whether 
most countries will be so shortsighted is still questionable and second, stringent 
environmental requirement does bring observable pecuniary benefits. Cleaner water will 
lower the costs of treating water by industries in their production processes, cleaner air 
and more nutritious soil will help reduce crop injury and boost agricultural output, and 
more importantly, the improved environmental quality will bring a healthier and therefore 
more productive workforce. 24Compared to the few percentage points cost, the significant 
benefits of enhanced environmental protection are more possible to play an important 
role in governments’ cost-benefit balancing.  
What is more, though the production cost may be an important factor that affects 
competitive advantage, it is not the only factor that counts. With the number of 
environment-conscious consumers growing, firms, especially those multinational firms 
that are based in countries with active environmental communities, become more and 
                                                 
23 See Stewart, supra note 13, at 2069. 
24 See id. at 2065. 
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more sensitive to their reputation in the international market.25 We should not forget that 
it was the unilateral public announcement by Johnson Wax, the consumer products 
company, to replace CFCs in its brand-leading products such as Pledge and Glade in 
1975, ten years before the creation of the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the 
Ozone Layer that triggered a competitive race for CFC-free aerosols in the United 
States.26 Without any government intervention, most companies’ fear of losing sales to 
environmentally conscious consumers drove them voluntarily away from CFCs to butane 
propellants. Empirical studies have shown that industrial environmental leaders can 
always recoup costs in the marketplace, and, under some circumstances may even enjoy 
certain competitive advantages. As an example, firms that accord with the environmental 
management standards promulgated by the International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO 14000) seem to enjoy certain competitive advantages, including lower liability 
insurance, less regulatory oversight, and increased access to customers27. And in certain 
fields, the adoption of ISO 14001 has become a prerequisite for market access to 
international markets. For example, the car manufacturers Rover and Jaguar, located in 
the UK, have required that more than 1000 of their first tire suppliers of products either 
achieve or move towards ISO 14001.28 Indeed, with more and more consumers willing to 
pay extra money for environment-friendly products, “green products” and “green 
technology” themselves become a new market focus. This explains the phenomenon that 
organic grocery stores like Earth Fare within which the price for an apple may be two or 
three times higher than that in Wal-Mart still enjoy high profitability. In short, when 
                                                 
25 See Nordstrom & Vaughan, supra note 5, at 41. 
26 See HUNTER, SALZMAN & ZAELKE, supra note 2, Cha 9, at 535. 
27 See Nordstrom & Vaughan, supra note 5, at 41. 
28 See HUNTER, SALZMAN & ZAELKE, supra note 2, Cha 18, at 1422. 
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consumers care, market forces often reward good environmental performance rather than 
cost savings at any price. And in this case a high environmental standard may serve as a 
comparative advantage itself. 
Yet market force cannot be counted to solve all the problems themselves. It is only 
recently that the consumers become sensitive to environmental profile of products and 
producers, which attribute greatly to the persistent efforts of non-governmental 
organizations around the world. Also, governments may be incompetent, shortsighted, or 
even corrupt so that they may not weigh the benefits of environmental protection against 
it costs correctly. Yet this may happen with or without trade. From the discussion above 
we can conclude that the difference in the stringency of environmental standards among 
countries barely affect their competitiveness as a whole and it is definitely not reasonable 
to regard the competitive concern rather than a country’s actual assimilative capacity as a 
decisive factor in the country’s adoption of certain environmental policies. If for some 
reasons the governments do think so, it is not trade that should be blamed. Governments 
should play their part by basing their policy choice on scientific analysis rather than 
unreasonable assumption. And as a matter of fact, the competitiveness concerns are only 
enough to make governments seek cooperative solution to environmental problems 
before they apply certain environmental measures unilaterally, which actually serves as a 
positive force for the growing number of multilateral environmental agreements. 
The effect of economic growth promoted by trade on environment 
Trade is an approach mastered by human society to promote economic prosperity and 
finally improve the welfare of human beings as a whole. However, it has been claimed 
that economic growth leads to unsustainable consumption beyond the environmental 
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carrying capacities and finally exhausts all the natural resources necessary for human 
activities, especially those non-renewable resources such as fossil fuels. Thus trade, as 
the promoter of economic growth, should be limited. However, the consistent discovery 
of new deposits of fossil fuels has met the demand, and a more practical question now is 
whether we should use them considering the negative effect on global climate. In 
addition, as long as poverty is still a common phenomenon on this planet and the rich 
developed countries do not want to help their poor neighbors for free, economic growth is 
still necessary. Indeed, one reason for the environmental problems in many developing 
countries is that these countries could not afford an adequate level of environmental 
protection. Economic growth can allow these countries to shift from some more 
immediate concerns to long-run sustainability issues. A famous example here is the 
Kuznets curve29, which shows that pollution increases at the early stages of development 
but decreases after a certain income level has been reached.  
But it is not right to think the Kuznets curve will turn naturally and necessarily. It will 
only turn when the income growth is accompanied by improved political conditions, and 
in developing countries, the quality of environment will be improved only if economic 
growth and institutional and democratic reforms go hand in hand. Yet even this is more 
practical than an effort to stop economic growth all over the world by eliminating 
international trade. Trade can help achieve a more sustainable economic growth by 
spreading environmental-friendly technologies around the world. 
In summary, the relation between trade and environment is much more complicated 
than a simple question of yes or no. Yet both economic theories and empirical studies fail 
to support there is any inherent or fundamental conflict between the protection of 
                                                 
29 See HUNTER, SALZMAN & ZAELKE, supra note 2, Cha 2, at 55. 
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environment and an open, multilateral trading system. Accompanied with appropriate 
political mechanisms and social policies, trade can benefit the resolution of 
environmental problems by rationalizing the use of natural resources. A good example 
here is the policies that aim at the internalization of environmental externalities. As 
addressed above, theoretically, trade liberalization and environmental protection both aim 
at “rationalizing” the use of resources. However, because many environmental resources 
are “public goods” and thus priced as zero in the market and the cost of pollution and 
other environmental impairment is usually bore by the whole society rather than the 
producers themselves, which is usually referred to as environmental externalities, the 
price mechanism sometimes fail to reflect the true cost of the totality of the resource 
being used during production in the international market thus far.30 A number of political 
efforts have been made to address this problem, including tax or fees imposed on a source 
in proportion to the environmental degradation it imposes, such as the wetland 
compensation fees in the United States and pollution permit systems requiring each 
source to hold permits corresponding to the amount of pollution it emits.31 As long as 
these policies will spread around the world and work well enough to make the market 
price of certain products closer to their actual costs, liberalized trade will help transfer the 
focus of international markets from industries with high input of environmental resources 
to those with less environmental costs such as industry of services or technology.  
In this chapter we mainly discussed the general relation between trade and 
environment. Yet another important respect of the trade-environment debate is 
                                                 
30 See HUNTER, SALZMAN & ZAELKE, supra note 2, Cha 3, 129-130 (quoting David Pearce et al., Blueprint 
for a Green Economy 154-57 (1989)). 
31 See Alan Carlin, U.S. E.P.A., the United States Experience with Economic Incentives to Control 
Environmental Pollution, EPA-230-R-92-001, Cha 3, July 1992. 
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practically, whether trade measures could be used as a leverage to reach specific 
environmental purpose both domestically and internationally under a multilateral trading 
system. Considering the critical role of WTO in trade liberalization and disputes 
settlement in environment-related trade issues, we will use WTO as an example to 
discuss this practical issue in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE ROLE OF WTO IN ADDRESSING THE TRADE-ENVIRONMENT ISSUE 
In 1991, a dispute settlement panel under the old GATT concluded that the United 
States violated its GATT obligations for its embargo on tuna caught by fishing methods 
causing high dolphin mortality.32 Since this well-known Tuna-Dolphin case, the decisions 
or actions of WTO/GATT on environment-related trade issues have kept attracting the 
attentions, if not only critics, of both trade specialists and environmentalists. Has WTO 
provided chances for the greening of international trade so that to achieve “the objective 
of a sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and 
to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and 
concerns at different levels of economic development”33, which has given color, texture 
and shading to the rights and obligations of Members under the WTO agreement 
generally and under the GATT 1994 particularly? Before these issues are discussed, a 
brief overview of the history and the treaty structure of the WTO/GATT system and the 
different types of environmental measures that may raise WTO concerns under these 
treaties will assist a better understanding of the materials that follows. 
A brief overview 
1. The history34: 
                                                 
32 See United States –Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Report of the Panel, DS21/R – 39S/155, September 
3, 1991[hereinafter Tuna 1]. 
33 JOHN H. JACKSON, WILLIAM J. DAVEY, ALAN O. SYKES, JR., DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT TO LEGAL 
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, preamble, para.1, at 3 [hereinafter Documents Supp.] 
34 See JOHN H. JACKSON, WILLIAM J. DAVEY AND ALAN O, SYKES, JR., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, American Casebook Series, Cha 6, 209-210 (4th ed., 2002).  
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With the original idea to create a broader international organization to be named the 
“International Trade Organization” (ITO), a full preparatory conference convened in 
Geneva from April to October 1947. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) was drafted at the Geneva conference, simultaneously with the tariff 
negotiations and the work on the ITO charter. The basic idea for the General Agreement 
was to embody the results of the tariff negotiations and also include some of the general 
protective clauses to prevent evasion of the tariff commitments, as a subsidiary 
agreement under the ITO Charter. However, though the General Agreement was accepted 
and applied through “Protocol of Provisional Application” (PPA) soon after the 
conference, the ITO was dead due to the persistent resistance from the Congress of the 
United States, and thus the GATT became the central organization for coordination 
national policies on international trade, a role it was not intended to perform. Due to this 
troubled history, the GATT was crippled in many ways and faced many problems. As a 
result, at the end of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations in 1994, a new and better-
defined international organization and treaty structure was created to carry forward 
GATT’s work.  
2. The treaty structure35and potential trade-environment conflicts under these treaties.   
GATT 1947&1994: the General Agreement on Trade and Tariff, as amended and 
changed through the Uruguay Round, embraces a variety of treaty instruments and 
provides an important code of rules regulating international trade. With the objective to 
liberalize trade, one of the core rules in the GATT is to constrain governments from 
imposing or continuing a variety of measures that restrain or distort international trade, 
including tariffs (Article II), quotas, internal taxes and regulations, subsidy and dumping 
                                                 
35 See JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, JR., supra note 34. 
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practices and other non-tariff measures (Article XI) that distort trade. At the core of the 
General Agreement are two nondiscrimination principles: the most-favored-nation 
principle and the national treatment principle. The most-favored-nation principle of 
Article I provides equal treatment of “like products” originating or destined for all other 
contracting parties. The national treatment principle of Article III provides equal 
treatment between domestic and imported products. The General Agreement also has a 
number of exceptions, most of which are provided under Article XX. Trade-related 
environmental measures regulating production process that will not affect the 
characteristics of the products produced such as trade restriction on shrimp caught at the 
risk of high mortalities of sea turtles are most controversial under the General Agreement. 
Because all the obligations above point to “like products”, the determination of which is 
mainly based on the characteristics of product itself, such environmental measures will 
constitute violation of the obligations under the General Agreement for providing 
different treatment for “like products” unless they are justified by any particular 
exception under Article XX.  
TBT&SPS: Through the Uruguay Round, a number of side agreements on 12 topics 
ranging from agriculture to preshipment inspection were created. The Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade and the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures, two of these side agreements that have direct environmental 
implication, regulate the application of technical regulations and standards, including 
measures taken for health reasons and they are mutually exclusive: the SPS Agreement 
deals with diseases, pests, disease-causing organisms, as well as additives, contaminants, 
toxins or disease-causing organisms in foods, beverage or feedstuffs, while the TBT 
 23
applies to all other product standards. Both TBT and SPS seek to promote the use of 
harmonized international standards among Members while allowing Members a certain 
degree of freedom to set their own standards. Environmental measures related to the 
characteristics of product itself including regulation of pesticide residues in food, taxes 
on the lead content of fuels, standard for sanitary conditions in slaughterhouses are 
covered under these two agreements. 
GATS: The General Agreement on Trade in Services, created in the Uruguay Round, 
regulates a broad range of different service sectors, such as banking, tourism insurance, 
brokerage, tourism, etc.  The GATS agreement is comparable to the GATT agreement, 
which has counterpart provisions to MFN, national treatment and general exceptions. 
TRIPS: The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights is 
designed to require governments to ensure a certain minimum level of protection, both 
substantively and procedurally, for patents, copyrights, industrial designs, trademarks, 
business matters and similar matters. It also has clauses concerning MFN, national 
treatment as well as exceptions for national security. TRIPS agreement embraces a 
number of intellectual property rights with implication for environmental protection, such 
as sui generis systems for plant variety protection. It may also be relevant to the transfer 
and disseminating of environmental technology. 
Along with the major substantive agreements above are the WTO Charter and the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), a document that established a new dispute 
settlement system and has in effect played an important role in the trade and environment 
issues. Under the DSU, when a dispute appears, the disputing parties are first asked to 
enter consultation to seek a consensus solution. If this fails, as it always does, the WTO 
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Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) establishes a panel to hear the dispute. The panel makes 
its findings and submits an interim report to the parties and then to the DSB for final 
adoption. The losing party may appeal to an Appellate Body for review of issue of law. A 
dramatic difference between the current WTO dispute settlement system and the one 
previously practiced under GATT is the panel and the Appellate Body reports are 
automatically adopted unless the membership decides by consensus against adoption, 
which is almost impossible in practice. This difference gives the new WTO dispute 
settlement system a significant advantage of effectiveness and efficiency in handling 
large numbers of disputes, including environment-related trade disputes, over other 
international dispute-resolution mechanisms.  
Finally it should be mentioned that a Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE)36 
was established as the result of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations to 
identify the relationships between trade and environmental measures and make 
appropriate recommendations for modification of the rules of the multilateral trading 
system when necessary. However, the CTE has failed to make any substantive action, 
largely due to its consensus-based decision-making process, with which a decision can be 
taken by a majority vote only after it has failed to be reached by consensus, and 
amendments to GATT 1994 or the multilateral trade agreement require a two-thirds, 
three-fourths or unanimous vote. Thus compared to the DSB, the role of CTE in the 
trade-environment debate is quite limited.  
Key trade-environment issues under WTO 
1. The environmental exceptions to GATT- Article XX 
                                                 
36 Trade and Environment, GATT Ministerial Decision of 14 April 1994, 33 ILM 1267 (1994). 
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Article XX of GATT provides general exceptions to the GATT obligations, including 
the three most substantive ones: most-favored-nation treatment obligation (MFN), 
National Treatment obligation and prohibition on quantitative restriction37. Though the 
word “environment” is not used, paragraph (b) and paragraph (g) of Article XX provide 
member states chances to justify their environment-inspired measures that collide with 
international trade: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on 
international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the 
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: 
    … 
    (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
    … 
    (g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such 
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption;…38 
The language of Article XX was first touched and interpreted in the Tuna-Dolphin 
case39 in 1991, which turned out to be a nightmare both for environmentalists and 
GATT/WTO40. After 20 years, with the far reaching Standard Gasoline case in 199641, 
                                                 
37 See Documents Supp. supra note 33, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947, as Amended, 
Article I, Article II, and Article XI, at 17-18, 20-21, 28-29. 
38 Documents Supp., supra note 33, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947, as Amended, Article 
XX, 45-46. 
39 Tuan 1, supra note 32. 
40 See DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE FUTURE, Institute for 
International Economics, Cha 2, at 55. 
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the Shrimp-Turtle case in199842 and the United State final success in the Shrimp-Turtle 
case in 200243, great changes have taken place in the interpretation of Article XX. 
1) A brief introduction of cases. 
A. Tuan-Dolphin 
In 1989, based on the recognition that the nets used to harvest tuna in the Eastern 
Tropical Pacific (ETP) were causing a significant rate of injury and death to dolphins 
entangled into the nets44, the United States revised the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 
1972 (MMPA) with the stated goal that the incidental kill or serious injury of marine 
mammals in the course of commercial fishing be reduced to insignificant levels 
approaching zero. 45The MMPA required that United States fishermen and others 
operating within the jurisdiction of the United States to use certain fishing techniques to 
reduce the incidental taking of dolphin in the harvesting of fish, 46and the United States 
Government ban the importation of commercial fish or products from any country that 
failed to establish a dolphin-protection regime “comparable” to that of the United States. 
In order to satisfy this requirement, foreign governments were required to prove to U.S. 
authorities that the incidental dolphin harm caused by their tuna fleet during a 
representative time period was no more than 1.25 times higher that the average taking by 
the U.S. fleet during the same time period. 47In addition, the MMPA provided that 
importation of certain tuna and tuna products from any “intermediary nation” shall also 
                                                                                                                                                 
41 United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Report of the Panel, WT/DS2/R, 
January 29,1996 [hereinafter Reformulated Gasoline] 
42See United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Production, Report of the Panel, 
WT/DS58/R, May 15, 1998, [hereinafter Shrimp 1] 
43 United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the Panel, 
WT/DS58/RW, June 15, 2001, [hereinafter Shrimp 2] 
44 Inter-American Tropical Tuan Commission, 1987 Annual Report 8-9 (1978). 
45 See Tuna 1, supra note 32, para.2.3  
46 See id. para.5.1. 
47 See id. para.5.2. 
 27
be prohibited, unless the intermediary nation proves that it too had acted to ban imports 
of such tuna and tuna products from the country subject to the direct import embargo.48 
In 1991, Mexico challenged the MMPA to the GATT, arguing that the measures 
under the MMPA were quantitative restrictions on importation that were forbidden under 
Article XI of GATT and also violated the National Treatment Obligation under Article 
III. The United States argued that (1) these measures were internal regulations under 
Article III: 4 and the Note Ad Article 349 and (2) even if these measures did violate 
Article XI and Article II, they were justified by Article XX exceptions for protection of 
animal life and conservation of exhaustible natural resources50. After finding that the 
MMPA was in violation of Article III and Article XI since the restriction under MMPA 
was based on the harvesting of tuna rather than the imported tuna as a product itself51, the 
Panel came to examine, for the first time in the history of GATT, whether a trade 
measure could be justified under Article XX. With the following findings, the Panel 
concluded that the United States failed to justify the MMPA with Article XX: 
a) The exceptions under Article XX should not be applied to measures that protect 
human, animal, and plant life or health or conserve natural resources outside the 
jurisdiction of the Contracting party taking the measure. 
b) A limitation on trade based on such unpredictable conditions as linked to the actual 
taking rate for United States fishermen during a particular period could not be regarded as 
necessary to protect the health or life of animals under Article XX (b). 
                                                 
48 See Tuna 1, supra note 32, para.5.3. 
49 See id. para.5.8. 
50 See id. para.5.22. 
51 See id. para.5.9-15. 
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c) Also, a limitation on trade based on unpredictable conditions could not be regarded as 
being primarily aimed at the conservation of dolphins and could not be considered as 
“related to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources” under Article XX (g).52 
The MMPA was challenged again by the European Union in 199453 and, with some 
difference in the reasoning from the former panel, the new Panel came to the same 
conclusion. And for both the two Tuna-Dolphin cases, the United States exercised its 
right to block adoption of the panel decision in the GATT, which left the dispute legally 
unresolved.  
B. Reformulated Gasoline case: 
Along with the two most criticized panel decisions of the Tuna-Dolphin cases came a 
number of international efforts aimed at balancing the economic growth and 
environmental goals, the most influential of which may be the “Agenda 21”from the Rio 
Conference in 1992. The “Agenda 21” urged states to ensure that international trade and 
environmental policies are “mutually supportive” with a view of “achieving sustainable 
development,” and called on governments to clarify the relationship between GATT 
provisions and multilateral environmental agreements. At the same time, a centralized, 
independent World Trade Organization was established by the Uruguay Round of 
negotiations in 1994, which included a new Preamble that expressly recognizes the 
obligation of governments to act in accordance with the objective of “sustainable 
development,” and to seek to “protect and preserve the environment”. The new WTO 
established a permanent Committee on Trade and Environment to address environmental 
                                                 
52 See Tuna 1, supra note 32, para.5.22-34. 
53 United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Report of the Panel, DS29/R, June 16, 1994[hereinafter 
Tuna 2] 
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issues, and more important, it made great changes in the dispute settlement process and 
established a new permanent tribunal, WTO Appellate Body. Exactly under such a 
background came out one of the most far-reaching cases about Article XX in the 
GATT/WTO history: the Reformulated Gasoline case. 
In 1996, the Venezuelan and Brazilian governments challenged a United States 
regulation (the “Gasoline Rule”) concerning the maximum levels of gasoline emissions 
permissible in domestic and imported gasoline to the new WTO. The Gasoline Rule, 
promulgated by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the Clean Air Act 
with the aim to reduce air pollution in the United States established the reformulated 
gasoline program and conventional gasoline program, both of which required changes in 
the composition of gasoline sold to consumers, using 1990 as a baseline year. However, 
the baseline establishment rules distinguished between foreign and domestic refiners: 
domestic refiners were permitted to establish individual baselines with three methods, 
while foreign refiners were generally not allowed to do so and were required instead to 
use the statutory baseline established by the EPA.54 Venezuela and Brazil argued that the 
Gasoline Rule unlawfully discriminated against imported gasoline and thus violated the 
National Treatment obligation. The United States responded that the treatment accorded 
to imported gasoline was “on the whole” no less favourable since the statutory standard 
baseline for foreign refiners and the average of the sum of the individual baselines for 
domestic refiners both corresponded to average gasoline quality in 1990 and thus the 
domestic and imported gasoline was treated equally “overall”.55  
                                                 
54 See Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 41, para.6.1, 6.4.  
55 See id. para.6.14. 
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In addition, United States argued that even if the rule did violate the National 
Treatment obligation, it was nevertheless justified under Article XX since it “was 
primarily aimed” at conserving clean air and “necessary” to protect human, animal and 
plant life against air pollution.56 The United States further explained that an individual 
baseline for foreign refiners was not feasible for the goal of the Gasoline Rule because 
the verification of the data submitted by foreign refiners on which a reliable individual 
baseline can be established and the enforcement techniques such as criminal and civil 
sanctions for false data would not be possible against foreign refiners located outside the 
jurisdiction of the United States.57  
Finding that the “no less favourable” treatment of Article III: 4 has to be applicable to 
each individual case and less favourable treatment of particular imported products in 
some instances could not be balanced by more favourable treatment in other instances,58 
the panel rejected the US argument and concluded that the Gasoline Rule violated the 
National Treatment obligation.  
Noting that under the application of antidumping law, the United States permits 
foreign companies to submit individual data, which was comparable to the foreign data in 
this case, the Panel rejected the United States’ argument that individual baselines for 
foreign refiners were not available and found that the baseline establishment method of 
the Gasoline Rule was not “necessary” under Article XX (b).59 In addition, in the Panel’s 
view, since the United States could have afforded treatment of imported gasoline 
consistent with its Article III: 4 obligations without hindering its pursuit of conservation 
                                                 
56 See Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 41, para.6.22, 6.36. 
57 See id. para.6.23. 
58 See id. para.6.14. 
59 See id. para.6.28, 6.29. 
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policies under the Gasoline Rule, the less favourable baseline establishments methods 
were “not primarily” aimed at the conservation of natural resources under Article XX 
(g).60 
The United States appealed the panel finding that the Gasoline Rule was not justified 
under the Article XX (g) exception, and thus the case came before the Appellate Body.61 
This is exactly the first case before Appellate body. The final 25-page Appellate Body 
report, which has been one of the landmarks in the history of the WTO disputes 
settlement, readdressed some most controversial considerations by the Panel and 
provided more flexible interpretations for the Article XX (g) and, more importantly, the 
introductory clause of Article XX (the Chapeau). 
In examining whether a trade measure could be justified under Article XX, the 
Appellate body took a new two-tiered test: first, the provisional justification of the 
particular exceptions- paragraphs (a) to (j); second, further appraisal of the same measure 
under the Chapeau.62 
The Appellate Body came to examine, first, whether the baseline establishment rules 
fell within the terms of paragraph (g) of Article XX. Against the Panel’s reasoning 
whether the “less favourable treatment” of imported gasoline was related to the 
conservation of natural resources, the Appellate Body found it was the “measure”, 
namely the baseline establishment rules as a whole that should be examined63. In 
addition, the Appellate Body Found that within certain terms of paragraph (g), “related 
                                                 
60 See Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 41, para.6.40.  
61 United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Report of the Appellate Body, 
WT/DS2/AB/R, April 29, 1996[hereinafter Reformulated Gasoline App.] 
62 See id. at 14. 
63 See id. at 8-10. 
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to” could not be interpreted as “primarily aimed at”64 and “in conjunction with” did not 
require identical treatment of domestic and imported products, but rather “even-
handedness” in the imposition of restrictions65. Based on the findings above, the 
Appellate Body rejected the Panel’s notion and concluded that the Gasoline Rule fell 
within the terms of Article XX (g).           
Then the Appellate Body came to examine whether the Gasoline Rule could pass the 
test of the Chapeau, the purpose of which, in the view of the Appellate Body, was to 
avoid abuse or illegitimate use of the exceptions to substantive rules under the GATT 
available in Article XX66. And the Appellate Body found that the United States had 
failed: first, to explore adequate alternatives, including in particular cooperation with the 
governments of Venezuela and Brazil, of mitigating the administrative problems67; 
second, to count the costs for foreign refiners that would result from the imposition of 
statutory baselines68. Since the resulting discrimination must have been foreseen, and was 
not merely inadvertent or unavoidable, the Appellate Body concluded that the baseline 
establishment rules in the Gasoline Rule, in their application, constituted “unjustifiable 
discrimination” and a “disguised restriction on international trade” that is prohibited 
under the Chapeau and thus were not entitled to the justifying protection afforded by 
Article XX as a whole.69 
C. Shrimp-Turtle 
                                                 
64 See Reformulated Gasoline App., supra note 61, at 12. 
65 See id. 13-14. 
66 See id. at 15. 
67 See id. at 19. 
68 See id. at 20. 
69 See id. 
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Beginning in 1987, the United States issued a series of regulations requiring U.S. 
shrimp trawl vessels to use approved “turtle-excluder devices” (TEDs) in all areas where 
there was a risk of interaction with the protected sea turtle species. In 1989, the United 
States enacted Section 609 of the Endangered Species Act, which called on the Secretary 
of State to initiate international negotiations for the purpose of entering into treaties to 
protect the endangered sea turtles. In addition, Section 609 imposed a ban on shrimp 
imports from states that failed to establish a sea turtle protection program “comparable” 
to that of the United States, which took effect in May of 1991. However, the Department 
of State issued guidelines providing that the ban applied only to fourteen countries in the 
Caribbean/Western Atlantic region, granting these countries a three-year period in which 
to phase-in measures to avoid the ban. In December 1995, the Court of International 
Trade issued a decision ruling against the guidelines and directed the Department of the 
State to impose the ban worldwide within the next four months. The latter complied the 
ruling in April 1996. Four countries (India, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Thailand) that were 
subject to the new ban, but had previously been exempted from the ban under the old 
guidelines, filed a WTO complaint, claiming the United States import ban under Section 
609 was quantitative restriction eliminated under Article XI:1. Once again the United 
States claimed Article XX (b) and (g) as defense.70 In examining whether the import ban 
under Section 609 was justified by Article XX, the Panel recalled the finding against 
unilateralism of the Panel in Tuna Dolphin 2 that:  
If Article XX were interpreted to permit contracting parties to deviate from the 
obligations of the General Agreement by taking implement policies, including 
conservation policies, within their own jurisdiction, the basic objectives of the General 
                                                 
70 Shrimp 1, supra note 42. 
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Agreement would be maintained. If however Article XX were interpreted to permit 
contraction parties to take trade measures so as to force other contraction parties to 
change their policies within their jurisdiction, including their conservation policies, the 
balance of rights and obligations among contracting parties, in particular the right of 
access to markets, would be seriously impaired. Under such an interpretation the General 
Agreement could no longer serve as a multilateral framework for trade among contracting 
parties.71  
In the light of this analysis, the Panel found that Section 609, as applied, conditioned 
access to the US market for a given product on the adoption by exporting Members of 
conservation policies that the United States considers to be comparable to its own terms 
of regulatory programmes and incidental taking and accordingly the measure constituted 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail 
forbidden by the Chapeau and thus was not permitted under Article XX.72   
The United States appealed and the Appellate Body began its analysis of Article XX 
with an overall rejection of the reasoning process of the Panel.73   
The appellate Body first reaffirmed the two-tiered analysis of Article XX, 
emphasizing that the sequence of steps was the reflection of the fundamental structure 
and logic of Article XX, not inadvertence or random choice. Thus the panel’s 
disregarding the specific exceptions of Article XX (b) and (g) in favor of the Chapeau 
was inappropriate.74 Moreover, the Appellate Body held that in interpreting the language 
of Article XX, the Panel should look at the purpose and object of Article XX itself and 
                                                 
71 See Shrimp1, supra note 42, at 294, n.257. 
72 See id. 294,295. 
73 United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the Appellate 
Body, WT/DS58/AB/R, October 12, 1998[hereinafter Shrimp1, App.] 
74 See id. para.118-122. 
 35
maintaining the WTO multilateral trading system was not a right or an obligation and 
could not be employed to interpret the Chapeau.75 
Finally, the Appellate Body rejected the notion of the Panel that WTO members may 
not unilaterally prescribe conditions for access to their markets, noting that conditioning 
access to a Member’s domestic market on exporting Members’ compliance or adoption of 
policies unilaterally prescribed by the importing Member, in which important and 
legitimate domestic policies have been embodied, may be a common aspect of measures 
falling within the scope of one or another of the exceptions (a) to (j) of Article XX, and 
the interpretation of the Panel would render most of the specific exceptions of Article XX 
inutile.76 
After reversing the Panel’s findings, the Appellate Body came to examine the 
justification of Section 609 under Article XX. Appellate Body came to the first tier of the 
analysis and found that Section 609, in its general design and structure, was a measure 
relating to the conservation of sea turtles since the import ban was imposed on shrimp 
that have been harvested with commercial fishing technology which may adversely affect 
sea turtles and excluded the shrimp harvested under conditions that did not adversely 
affect sea turtles or within the jurisdiction of the certified countries.77 Moreover, Section 
609 was an even-handed measure since the United States shrimp trawlers were also 
required to use approved TEDs where there was a likelihood of intercepting sea turtles 
and the penalties for violations included civil and criminal sanctions78. Thus, the 
                                                 
75 See Shrimp1, App., supra note 73, para.116.  
76 See id. para.121. 
77 See id. para.138-142. 
78 See id. para.144. 
 36
Appellate Body concluded that Section 609 was characterized as provisionally justified 
under the terms of Article XX (g). 
However, the Appellate Body found that the implementation of Section 609 
constituted “unjustifiable” and “arbitrary” discrimination and thus failed to satisfy the 
second tier of the analysis, namely the Chapeau. The Appellate Body based its conclusion 
on both substantive and procedural considerations:  
First, though the statue of Section 609 itself permitted imports from states with 
comparable regulation regimes79, in implementing Section 609, the United States not 
only failed to engage in serious negotiations for the protection of sea turtles with relative 
countries80, but also required other WTO Members to adopt an essentially identical 
regulatory program as that applied to the United States shrimp trawl vessels excluding all 
shrimp caught in waters of countries that had not been certified by the United States  
from the U.S. market, even those caught by using methods identical to those employed in 
United States81. This suggested to the appellate body that the application of the measure 
was more concerned with effectively influencing WTO Members to adopt essentially the 
same regime as that applied by United States, rather than to protect sea turtles.82 
Second, the certification processes followed by the United States in applying Section 
609 was neither transparent nor predictable83 and it did not provide foreign interests any 
opportunity to be heard, to receive a written, reasoned decision, or to respond to 
arguments against them84. Such a lack of transparency and procedural fairness of the 
                                                 
79 See Shrimp1, App., supra note 73, para.161. 
80 See id. para.166. 
81 See id. para.163-165. 
82 See id. para.165. 
83 See id. para.180. 
84 See id. para.180. 
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application of Section 609 reflected that Section 609, as it applied, was a measure of 
“arbitrary discrimination” under the Chapeau.  
Finally, the Appellate Body concluded that Section 609, though recognized as 
legitimate under paragraph (g) of Article XX, had been applied against the requirement of 
the Chapeau and thus did not qualify for the exemption of Article XX.85  
As a response to the Appellate Body Report, on July 8 1999, the United States 
Department of State issued Revised Guidelines for the implementation of Section 60986 
and submitted it to the DSB. The Revised Guidelines introduced more flexibility in 
considering the comparability of foreign programs and the US program by, for example, 
providing criteria with which a country may be certified on the basis of having a 
regulatory programme not involving the use of TEDs87. Moreover increased the 
transparency and predictability of the certification process by providing foreign interests 
a timetable and procedures within which review by the Department of the State of the 
relative information was available by request of the harvesting countries88 and their 
special concerns and situations could be taken into account in decision-making of the 
certifications89. As a result, when challenged again by Malaysia to WTO in 2001, Section 
609 with the Revised Guidelines for the implementation was finally upheld by the Panel 
and Appellate Body in 200290. This is the first time in the history of WTO disputes 
settlement that a trade-related environmental measure was justified under Article XX.  
2) Interpreting Article XX: WTO’s effort to green international trade and the GATT  
                                                 
85 See Shrimp1, App., supra note 73, para.186. 
86 See United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the Panel, 
WT/DS58/RW, para.2.22-2.32, June 15, 2001 [hereinafter Shrimp2] 
87 See id. para.2.28. 
88 See id. para.2.27.  
89 See id. para.2.30. 
90 See United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the Appellate 
Body, WT/DS58/AB/RW, October 22, 2001[hereinafter Shrimp2, App.] 
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The language of Article XX is so general that whether an environmental trade 
measure can be justified under Article XX usually depends on how it is interpreted by the 
Panel or the Appellate body of WTO. With both determination and discretion of WTO in 
opening the door for environment-inspired trade measures, the interpretation of Article 
XX by the Panel or the Appellate body in different cases may differ from one another or 
even be in conflicts. The following are the main focuses of controversy. 
A. The jurisdiction of paragraphs (b) and (g):  
     Non-extraterritorialÆ No territorial limitationÆ “sufficient nexus” 
Is there any jurisdictional limitation on the application of Article XX? Should the 
“human, animal or plant life or health” under paragraph (b) or the “exhaustible natural 
resources” under paragraph (g) be limited to be within the territory of the country 
invoking Article XX? These questions first appeared in the two Tuna-Dolphin cases and 
to some extent are still left in doubt since, not only the plain language of Article XX itself 
does not give any answers to these questions, but also the theories about the jurisdiction 
in international law are distinct and controversial. Under public international law, there 
are several relative principles about the jurisdiction of a state: (a) the territorial principle 
that the state may control activities or resources within its territory, which has received 
universal recognition; (b) the nationality principle that a state may control the activities of 
its own citizens, no matter whether inside or outside its territory, which is limited by 
many states; (c) the passive personality principle that a state may have jurisdiction over 
aliens for acts abroad harmful to its nationals, which is the least justifiable of the various 
bases of jurisdiction.91 In Tuna-Dolphin 1, the Panel, which seemed to be in favor of the 
territorial principle, addressed this issue in the light of “the drafting history of Article XX 
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(b), the purpose of this provision, and the consequences that the interpretations proposed 
by the parties would have for the operation of the General Agreement as a whole”92. It 
also found that “the concerns of the drafters of Article XX focused on the use of sanitary 
measures to safeguard life or health of humans, animals or plants within the jurisdiction 
of the importing country”93, and with the broad interpretation, the General Agreement 
would “then no longer constitute a multilateral framework for trade among all contracting 
parties”94, thus implicitly denying the extraterritorial application of the provision.  
However, such reasoning was rejected completely in Tuna-Dolphin 295. Against the 
previous panel’s finding, the Panel of Tuna-Dolphin 2 found that in the light of the 
Vienna Convention for the treaty interpretation, the preparatory work of the treaty and the 
circumstances of its conclusion could only be permitted as supplementary means of 
interpretation under limited conditions96. Even if it could be used in this certain case, the 
Panel found the statements and drafting changes made during the negotiation of the 
General Agreement did not provide clear support for any particular contention on the 
question of the jurisdiction limitation of paragraph (g)97 and thus could not support the 
conclusion that the provisions of Article XX (g) apply only to policies related to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources located within the territory of the 
contracting party.98 Then, with the further considerations that: (1) the text of Article XX 
(g) does not spell out any limitation on the location of the exhaustible natural resources to 
                                                 
92 See United States –Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Report of the Panel, DS21/R – 39S/155, para.5.25, 
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94 Id. para.5.27. 
95 See United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Report of the Panel, DS29/R, June 16, 1994 
[hereinafter Tuna 2] 
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97 See id. 
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be conserved; (2) measures with respect to things located, or actions occurring, outside 
the territorial jurisdiction of the party taking the measure could in principle be taken 
under other paragraphs of Article XX and other Articles of the General Agreement, such 
as Article XX (e), which relates to products of prison labour; (3) under general 
international law, a state may in particular regulate the conduct of its fishermen, or of 
vessels having its nationality or any fishermen on these vessels, with respect to fish 
located in the high seas,99the Panel concluded that the United States’ policy to conserve 
dolphins in the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean fell within the range of the policies covered 
by Article XX (g).  Thus, the Panel appeared to accept that Article XX could have 
extraterritorial reach, in so far as under the limitation of international law.100 In this case, 
the Panel’s conclusion seemed to be based, in effect, on the active personality 
principle.101  
In the Shrimp-Turtle case, the Appellate body took a different approach in addressing 
this issue. Rather than discussing whether there is a jurisdictional limitation for the 
measures under Article XX, it provided a new standard, the “sufficient nexus” between 
the state invoking Article XX and the involved environmental resources.102 In reaching 
the conclusion that there was a sufficient nexus between the sea turtles and the United 
States, the Appellate Body considered that: sea turtles, as highly migratory animals, pass 
in and out of waters subject to the rights of jurisdictions of various coastal states and the 
high sea, the sea turtle species covered by Section 609 all occur in waters within the 
jurisdiction of the United States, and no exclusive ownership is claimed over sea turtles 
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in the ocean.103 With such a concern, dolphins, whales, and other migratory animals that 
occur within a state’s jurisdiction could be considered to have a sufficient nexus with the 
state. The ozone layer may also fall within the range of paragraph (g) as a certain kind of 
exhaustible natural resource since it does not belong to any state but exists in the 
atmosphere of every state. Thus the requirement of “sufficient nexus” appears to be more 
flexible and encompass a broader range of environmental policies.  
B. Paragraph (g): the understanding of “relating to”, “exhaustible natural resources”, and 
“in conjunction with” 
“Relating to”: “substantial relationship” rather than “primarily aimed at” 
A principle difference between paragraph (b) and (g) is that they use different 
standards to test the relation between the given trade measure and the purpose of the 
measure: “necessary” for the former and “relating to” for the later. Though the exact 
meaning of “relating to” is unknown, it seems to be less strict than the meaning of 
“necessary”. However, in the Reformulated Gasoline case, the Panel considered that to 
fall within paragraph (g), the given measure must be “primarily aimed at”104 the 
conservation of natural resources, which appeared “to have applied the ‘necessary’   test 
not only in examining the baseline establishment rules under Article XX (b), but also in 
the course of applying Article XX (g)”105. As a result, the finding of the Panel was 
reversed by the Appellate body. The Appellate Body, in the light of the Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties (Vienna Convention) that “a treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms 
                                                 
103 See Shrimp1, App., supra note 73, para.133. 
104 United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Report of the Panel, WT/DS2/R, 
para.6.39, January 29,1996 [hereinafter Reformulated Gasoline] 
105 Reformulated Gasoline, App., supra note 61, at 10. 
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of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”106, found that the 
policies and interests embodied in Article XX and its object and purpose could only be 
interpreted on a case-to-case basis, “by careful scrutiny o the factual and legal context in 
a given dispute, without disregarding the words actually used”107. It further pointed out 
that “primarily aimed at” was not itself treaty language and should not be used as a 
simple litmus test for inclusion or exclusion from paragraph (g)108. Then the Appellate 
Body, considering that without the baseline establishment rules, the scrutiny and 
monitoring of compliance with the Gasoline Rule would be impossible and the objective 
of the Gasoline Rule, preventing further air pollution, would be frustrated, concluded that 
the relationship between the baseline establishment rules and the conservation of clean air 
was substantial and not incidental or inadvertent.109  This “substantial relationship” 
interpretation was further reaffirmed by the Appellate Body in the Shrimp-Turtle case, 
which found that the means and ends relationship between Section 609 and the United 
States’ policy of conserving the sea turtles was a close and real one and a relationship that 
was “every bit as substantial as” that between the baseline establishment rules and the 
conservation of clean air in the Reformulated Gasoline case.110 
Another important question about the phrase “relating to”, the answer of which 
contributed to the difference between the findings of the Panel and the Appellate Body in 
the Reformulated Gasoline case, is what should be examined under the “relating to” 
requirement of paragraph (g). The Panel examined whether the “less favorable treatment” 
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110 See United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the Appellate 
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of imported gasoline was related to the conservation of clean air in the United States111 
and thus came to the conclusion against the United States. On the contrary, the Appellate 
Body found that it was the “measure”, i.e. the baseline establishment rules as a whole that 
should be examined under paragraph (g)112, and criticized the Panel’s referring to its 
conclusion on Article III: 4 instead of the measure in issue as “turning Article XX on its 
head”113. The Appellate Body further pointed out that the measure, i.e. the baseline 
establishment rules should not only be examined as a whole, but also be examined in the 
light of the other requirements of the Gasoline Rule, since the provisions of the baseline 
establishment rules could not be understood if scrutinized strictly by themselves, totally 
divorced from other sections of the Gasoline Rule which constituted part of the context of 
these provisions.114 
 “Exhaustible natural resources”: both living and non-living resources 
Whether animals such as dolphins or turtles can constitute “exhaustible natural 
resources” is less controversial than other issues under paragraph (g). Rather, the 
approach with which WTO/GATT addresses this issue has played a more important role. 
In the Shrimp-Turtle 1, the Appellate Body, taking into account not only the text of 
Article XX (g) and the preamble of the WTO Agreement, but also the recent 
acknowledgement by the international community of the importance of concerted 
bilateral or multilateral action to protect living natural resources as well as the frequent 
references to natural resources as embracing both living and non-living resources by the 
modern international conventions such as the 1982 United Nations Convention on the 
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Law of the Sea (UNCLS), found that measures to conserve exhaustible natural resources, 
whether living or non-living, may fall within Article XX (g).115 This reasoning process of 
the Appellate Body “has drawn the most praise from commentators for its new-found 
sensitivity to environmental considerations and welcome reliance on public international 
law outside the WTO”116. 
“In conjunction with”: the requirement of “even-handedness” 
The main issue under the second clause of paragraph (g), “if such measure are made 
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption”, is how 
to understand the requirement of “in conjunction with”, and whether, for example, 
identical treatment for domestic and imported products is implied under this requirement. 
These questions did not get addressed until the Reformulated Gasoline case. The Panel 
did not deal with this issue specifically with respect to the baseline establishment rules 
since it had earlier failed to past the test of “relating to”. But the Panel did make a general 
finding that a trade measure could only be considered to be made effective “in 
conjunction with” domestic production restrictions if it was primarily aimed at rendering 
these restrictions117. This finding did not give any light on the issue here since, as 
discussed above, the phrase “primarily aimed at” was itself not treaty language and need 
further interpretation. Also, that the Panel used the same standard for the two different 
but both important terms, “relating to” and “in conjunction with” under paragraph (g) 
made its finding far from acceptable.  
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Opposite to the Panel’s confusing, if not misleading, understanding of “in conjunction 
with”, the Appellate Body gave a thorough, clear and precise interpretation on this issue.  
In the light of the basic rule of treaty interpretation that the terms of a treaty are to be 
given their ordinary meaning, the Appellate body found that the second clause of 
paragraph (g) referred to governmental measures like baseline establishment rules being 
“promulgated or brought into effect” “together with” restrictions on domestic production 
or consumption of natural resources, namely, in the view of the Appellate body, a 
requirement of “even-handedness” in the imposition of restrictions upon the production 
or consumption of exhaustible natural resources.118 In addition, the Appellate Body made 
special emphasis on understanding the requirement of “even-handedness” that first, there 
was no textual basis for requiring “identical” treatment of domestic and imported 
products119 and second, due to the difficulty in determining causation in both domestic 
and international law and the substantial period of time before the effect of a given 
measure may be observable in the field of conservation of natural resources, an empirical 
effects test should not be used for the availability of paragraph (g)120. 
With these findings, the report of the Appellate Body did make a salutary distinction. 
With the Appellate Body’s more open-minded understanding of the second clause of 
paragraph (g), an import restriction measure with the policy goal of conservation of 
natural resources need neither to be companied with an identical treatment on domestic 
production or consumption, nor to have currently observable effect on the conservation 
goal to be justified under Article XX (g).   
C. The Chapeau: drawing a line of equilibrium 
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From a simple, long-untouched piece of language, to the focus of all the concerns or 
critics, the role changing of the Chapeau in the implementation and interpretation of 
Article XX may be the best reflection of the changing role WTO/GATT has played in the 
trade-environment agenda. Before the report of the Appellate Body in the Reformulated 
Gasoline case, the language of the Chapeau was barely touched since none of the 
concerned measures, such as the ban on imported tuna product or the baseline 
establishment rules had satisfied the requirement of the particular provision of paragraph 
(b) or (g). Only after the Appellate body in the Reformulated Gasoline case concluded 
that the baseline establishment rules fell within the terms of the paragraph (g), did both 
the environmentalists and the free traders get a chance to know how a trade-related 
environmental measure could pass the test of the Chapeau and finally be justified under 
Article XX. 
In the light of its expression, all the exceptions under Article XX are qualified by the 
Chapeau, the introductory provision, which sets up two tests for a given measure:  
a. Whether it is applied in a manner that could constitute arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail, and,  
b. Whether it is applied in a manner that could constitute a disguised 
restriction on international trade. 
Beginning with the report of the Appellate body, the main issues around which the 
interpretation of the Chapeau is developed are listed below: 
(1) The relation between the Chapeau and a particular exception in application  
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In the Reformulated Gasoline case, the Appellate Body found that to be protected by 
Article XX, the measure at issue must first, come under one of the particular exceptions, 
namely paragraph (a) to (j), and second, further satisfy the requirement of the Chapeau.121 
In the view of the Appellate Body, the purpose and object of the Chapeau was the 
prevention of “abuse”, a principle that while the particular exceptions of Article XX may 
be invoked as a matter of legal right, they should not be applied to frustrate or defeat the 
legal obligations of the holder of the right under the substantive rules of the General 
Agreement and thus must be applied with due regard both to the legal duties of the party 
claiming the exception and the legal right of the other parties concerned.122 This two-
tiered test provided by the Appellate Body in the Reformulated Gasoline case was 
reaffirmed in the first Shrimp-Turtle case, in which the Appellate Body rejected the 
Panel’s reversing of the sequence of the two-tiered test and found that the sequence of the 
steps set out in the Reformulated Gasoline case was the reflection of the fundamental 
structure and logic of Article XX, not inadvertence or random choice.123And the 
Appellate Body, based on the understanding of the purpose and object of the Chapeau by 
the Appellate Body in the Reformulated Gasoline case, summarized the task of 
interpreting and applying the Chapeau as “marking out a line of equilibrium” between the 
right to invoke an exception under Article XX and the other rights under the substantive 
provisions of the GATT 1994124. 
(2) The subject of the two-tiered test under the Chapeau: the measure itself or the 
manner in which the measure is applied? 
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As early as in the Reformulated Gasoline case, the Appellate Body already answered 
this question clearly with the finding that the Chapeau addresses, “not so much the 
questioned measure or its specific contents as such, but rather the manner in which that 
measure is applied”125. However, this general but important point was ignored by the 
Panel in the first Shrimp-Turtle case, which concluded that Section 609 failed to satisfy 
the requirement of the Chapeau simply because it was a measure conditioning access to 
its market upon the adoption by exporting Members of certain policies126. The finding 
was soon reversed by the following Appellate Body. In revering the Panel’s finding, the 
Appellate Body first recalled its finding above in the Reformulated Gasoline case and 
then further pointed out that the general design of a measure was distinguished from the 
application of the measure and should be examined in the course of determining whether 
that measure fell within any particular exception of Article XX following the Chapeau,127 
namely the first tier of the test of the Chapeau. Thus the Panel’s repeated focus on the 
design of Section 609 in examining its consistency with the Chapeau of constituted error 
in legal interpretation.  
(3) The qualification of unilateralism: whether a trade measure is disqualified by the 
Chapeau simply because it’s unilateral characteristics? 
Against international cooperation through multilateral agreements among different 
countries, unilateralism, where a country takes unilateral measure in order to affect other 
countries for various purposes, is always regarded as inappropriate in the field of 
international law, including international environmental law. As a multilateral trading 
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system, WTO/GATT used to hold a very negative attitude toward unilateralism, 
especially when it comes to measures conditioning market access for a given product to 
force exporting countries to adopt certain policies. In Tuna-Dolphin 2, the Panel found 
that permitting contracting parties to take trade measures so as to force other contracting 
parties to change their policies within their jurisdiction would seriously impair the 
balance of rights and obligations among contracting parties and the multilateral 
framework for trade established under the General Agreement; thus Article XX should 
not be interpreted to do so.128 This spirit was followed by the Panel in the Reformulated 
Gasoline case, which further noted that language of the DSU also stresses the primacy of 
the multilateral system and rejects unilateralism as a substitute129 and the security and 
predictability of trade relations under the WTO system would be threatened if Members 
were allowed to do so130. However, this traditional attitude has been changed by the 
Appellate Body in the first Shrimp-Turtle case. While reversing the Panel’s finding, the 
Appellate Body found that though maintaining the multilateral trading system is a 
fundamental premise underlying the WTO agreement, it is neither a right nor an 
obligation, nor could it be used as an interpretative rule in the appraisal of a given 
measure under the Chapeau.131 On the contrary, in the view of the Appellate Body, 
conditioning market access on the exporting Members’ adoption of or compliance with 
policies unilaterally prescribed by importing Members may be a common aspect of 
measures falling within the scope of the particular exceptions under Article XX 132. Thus 
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the Appellate Body has put it clearly on the record of the history of WTO that at least 
under Article XX, the availability of unilateralism is no longer a question.  
    (4) The understanding of “arbitrary discrimination”, “unjustifiable discrimination” and 
“disguised restriction” 
      In the Reformulated Gasoline case, the Appellate Body pointed out that “arbitrary 
discrimination”, “unjustifiable discrimination” and “disguised restrictions” should be 
read side-by-side since one may amount to another when taken in international trade 
under Article XX and thus the determination of the presence of “arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination” may also be taken into account in determining the presence of “disguised 
restriction.133 This finding of the Appellate Body is much more a general understanding 
than a detailed, operational standard. However, in the second Shrimp-Turtle case, the new 
factors below about Section 609 with the Revised Guidelines, which the Panel took into 
specific consideration in the second Shrimp-Turtle case, may throw some light on this 
issue: 
The improved flexibility of the application of Section 609  
Compared to the Section 609 in the first Shrimp-Turtle case, the Section 609 with the 
Revised Guideline, as it applied, was more flexible, since: 
a) The conservation programmes of exporting countries are no longer required to be 
“essentially the same” as that of the programmes of United States but only comparable in 
effectiveness; 
      b) The importation of shrimp harvested in other manners or under other 
circumstances may be allowed as long as the manner or circumstance does not pose a 
threat of the incidental taking of sea turtle; and 
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      c) The importation of shrimp harvested by vessels using TEDs is allowed, even if the 
exporting nation has not been certified pursuant to Section 609.134  
The transparency in decision-making process for certification  
Under the Revised Guidelines, during the decision-making process, exporting 
countries may request judicial review or reconsideration of the decisions when their 
certifications are denied.135 
Sustained pace of the negotiations and the prospect of their conclusion, the effective 
contribution of the United States in the context of these negotiations 
The panel considered that the United States made sustained and efficient scientific, 
diplomatic and financial contribution in a number of international conventions for the 
conservation of migratory species, such as the negotiation of the Memorandum of 
Understanding on the Conservation and Management of Marine Turtles and their 
Habitats of the Indian Ocean and South-East Asia.136 Here the Panel specially 
emphasized that though good faith efforts in these negotiations were required, the United 
States should not be held exclusively responsible for reaching an agreement.137 
Other “serious good faith efforts” such as technology transfer made to relative countries 
by United States since the adoption of the reports of the original Panel and the Appellate 
body.138  
It was on the basis of the above considerations that the Panel concluded that the 
United States has demonstrated that “Section 609 is not applied so as to constitute a 
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disguised restriction on trade”139 and thus “is justified under Article XX of the GATT 
1994 as long as the conditions… in particular the ongoing serious, good faith efforts to 
reach a multilateral agreement, remain satisfied”140. 
In summary, there is not a detailed, operational standard for what constitutes 
“arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” or “disguised restrictions”. The conclusion of 
the Panel or the Appellate Body about whether a concerned measure would satisfy the 
requirement of the Chapeau of Article XX should be made on a case-by-case basis, in the 
light of the purpose of the Chapeau, drawing a line of equilibrium between a Member’s 
right under Article XX and its obligation and other members’ rights under substantive 
provisions of the GATT. As the Appellate Body in the first Shrimp-Turtle case pointed 
out, the location of the line, “is not fixed and unchanging”141 and it “moves as the kind 
and the shape of the measures at stake vary and as the facts making up specific cases 
differ”142. 
3) Evaluating the development of Article XX 
The attitude of WTO/GATT, as a multilateral trade system, towards a trade-related 
environmental measure that is best reflected in the understanding and interpretation of 
Article XX, is not unchanging. When the GATT was crafted more than 50 years ago, the 
connection of environmental protection with the development of human beings was not 
available, and the concept of environmental law or international environmental law was 
not mature. Along with the growing and developing of international environmental law 
and a worldwide acknowledgement of the status of the environment, the attitude of the 
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WTO/GATT is evolving. And the language of Article XX of the GATT, which was once 
interpreted narrowly, must be, as the Appellate Body of the first Shrimp-Turtle case 
pointed out, read in the light of the contemporary concerns of the community of nations 
about the protection and conservation of the environment143. And from Tuna-Dolphin to 
Shrimp-Turtle, it is not hard to find out that the Dispute Settlement Body, recalling the 
explicit recognition by WTO Members of the objective of sustainable development, is 
making efforts towards a more flexible interpretation of Article XX, and a more 
environment-friendly attitude of the whole multilateral trade regime of WTO: a unilateral 
trade-related environmental measure is no longer unacceptable under WTO, the 
jurisdictional justification of the measure is not so much a question, and most important, 
the focus of the requirement of Article XX has shifted, from whether the challenged 
measure itself falls within the provision of Article XX (b) or (g), to whether the 
implementation of the measure can be justified by the Chapeau. In short, though there is 
still a long way to go to the final equilibrium and reconciliation between the environment 
and trade interest, WTO has moved significantly toward such a great goal and offered 
chances for a trade-related environmental measure to be justified by Article XX, with 
which environmentalists can expect to continue winning battles in this trade-environment 
debate. 
2. “Like Products” and “Process and Production Methods” (PPMs)  
Under GATT, a country cannot discriminate between domestic products and imported 
products or imported products from different countries only when such products are “like 
products”. As a result, the meaning of “like products” turns to be very important, for 
environmental regulations often seeks to distinguish between similar products on the 
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basis of their environmental impacts. The main controversy between trade specialists and 
environmentalists on this issue is whether products with similar characteristics, but 
produced with different process or production methods, can be treated as like products 
under GATT.  
Generally there are two kinds of PPMs: PPMs that are directly related to the 
characteristics of the products concerned and PPMs that generally do not affect the 
products produced144. For the former, examples are pesticide used on food crops that 
produce residues in food products, cattle raised on growth hormones produce meat with 
hormone residues, unsanitary conditions in slaughterhouse result in meat that may be 
contaminated by disease-carrying organisms, and etc. Such PPMs are covered by SPS 
and TBT agreements145 under WTO and states may regulate such PPMs as long as they 
adhere to the disciplines in those Agreements. 
However, whether the other PPMs, are permissible under WTO is in doubt. Before 
WTO, the GATT restricted the determination of likeness on the physical characteristics 
of concerned products and whether these products are produced in different PPMs should 
not be taken into account in this issue146. Under the new WTO, the approach first taken in 
the Report of the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments147 has been developed by 
several panels and the Appellate Body. The approach now mainly consists of four 
criteria: the properties, nature and quality o the products, the end-use of the products, 
consumers’ taste and habits, in other words, consumers’ perceptions and behaviour in 
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respect of the products, and the tariff classification of the products. Though still, the 
PPMs issue was not addressed directly here, the introduction of consumers’ perceptions 
and behaviour in analyzing the likeness of the products seem to give chances to the 
consideration of PPMs, since more environmentally-conscious consumers may see 
environment-safe PPMs as an important factor in their choice of products.  
Recently, a small step has been taken towards a more flexible analysis by the 
Appellate Body in the EU Asbestos case148. In this case, the Appellate Body furthered the 
approach above to four categories of “characteristics”: the physical properties of the 
products, the extent to which the products are capable of serving the same or similar end-
use, the extent to which consumers perceive and treat the products as alternative means of 
performing particular functions in order to satisfy a particular want or demand, and 
international classification of the products for tariff purpose149.  
However, the Appellate Body pointed out that these criteria or characteristics are 
“simple tools to assist in the task of sorting and examining the relevant evidence”150 and 
are “neither a treaty-mandated nor a closed list of criteria that will determine the legal 
characterization of products”151. Thus they only serve as a framework for analyzing the 
likeness, which can aid but not dissolve the duty or the need to examine, in each case, all 
of the pertinent evidence.152  In this way, the Appellate Body reaffirmed the finding in the 
Japan-Alcoholic Beverages case that no one approach will be appropriate for all cases 
                                                 
148 European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, Report of the 
Appellate Body, WT/DS135/AB/R, March 12, 2001 [hereinafter EC-Asbestos] 
149 See id. para.101. 
150 Id. para.102. 
151Id. 
152 See id.  
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and an assessment utilizing an unavoidable element of individual, discretionary judgment 
has to be made on a case-by-case basis153. 
For the application of the four-criteria approach above, if adopted in an analysis, the 
Appellate Body required that a Panel should examine “the evidence relating to each of 
those four criteria” and weigh “all of that evidence, along with other evidence, in making 
an overall determination”154. 
The most innovative part of this report may be the claim of competitiveness as the 
fundamental for the determination of “likeness” under Article III. In its own words,  
As products that are in a competitive relationship in the marketplace could be affected 
through treatment of import “less favourable” than the treatment accorded to domestic 
products, it follows that the word “like” in Article III: 4 is to be interpreted to apply to 
products that are in such a competitive relationship. Thus, a determination of “likeness” 
under Article III: 4 is, fundamentally, a determination about the nature and extent of a 
competitive relationship between and among products.155 
With all the considerations above, this new approach to the “like-product” 
determination is much welcomer to the PPMs supporters. The case-by-case analysis can 
be applied to give appropriate deference to national political determinations, and the 
requirement of weighing all of the evidence relating to each of the four criteria along with 
other evidence makes it no longer appropriate to determine the likeness of products 
merely on the basis of their physical characteristics. More importantly, the claim of 
competitive relationship between or among products as the fundamental factor for the 
                                                 
153 See Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS8/R, November 1, 1996, 
para.113, 114. 
154 See EC-Asbestos, supra note 148, para.109. 
155 Id. para.99. 
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determination of “likeness” gives more chance to the consideration of PPMs in the course 
of analysis, sinceince, with other things equal, whether the PPMs of given products have 
environmental-negative impact will play a critical role in the competitiveness of these 
products, as long as consumers do care about environment.    
3. TBT and SPS: promote rather than require standards harmonization. 
Currently the product standards and regulations in different countries may differ from 
each other to a certain degree. Some of these distinctions are justified by differences in 
economic and social circumstances. However, others may serve as non-tariff 
impediments in international trade with the standards and regulations deliberately crafted 
to impose a cost disadvantage on foreign competitors. There are two WTO agreements 
specially addressing this issue: the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(SPS), which applies in general to measures taken to protect human, animals and plant 
life or health from certain specified risks, and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade (TBT), which applies to the use of other technical regulations and standards. One 
approach used by these Agreements to combat nontariff barriers is promoting the 
harmonization of different product regulations and standards in the member states on the 
basis of international standards.  
Such an approach is criticized by some environmentalists, who argue that the 
requirement of using international standards may force the downward harmonization of 
environmental laws. However, after examining the provisions of these two agreements 
carefully, we will conclude that such an argument is not reasonable, because while 
promoting standards harmonization, SPS and TBT both allow states enough freedom to 
set environmental standards higher than international standards. 
 58
1) The right of Members to adopt or enforce measures or standards  
In their preamble, both of the Agreements recognize the right of members to adopt or 
enforce measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health156, or for 
other purposes including the protection of environment157 as long as the application of 
such measures, standards or regulations does not constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between Members where the same conditions prevail or a disguised 
restriction on international trade158. Put in another way, Members can apply higher 
product standards as long as they are necessary to fulfill a justified purpose, such as the 
protection of environment, and are not applied in a way aiming at disturbing international 
trade. 
2) Substantive provisions about a higher standard 
A. SPS 
The use of higher sanitary or phytosanitary protection is justified substantially under 
the first part of Artcile3, paragraph 3: 
Members may introduce or maintain sanitary or phytosanitary measures which 
result in a higher level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection than would be 
achieved by measure based on the relevant international standards, guidelines or 
recommendations, if there is a scientific justification or as a consequence of the 
level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection a Member determines to be 
appropriate in accordance with the relevant provisions of paragraphs 1 through 8 
of Article 5159…160 
                                                 
156 See SPS, supra note 145, preamble, para.1. 
157 See TBT, supra note 145, preamble, para.6. 
158 See id.  
159 Requirement of Risk Assessment. 
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The second part of this provision requires such measures shall not be inconsistent 
with any other provisions of the Agreement161. 
So for a member to justify a measure with a higher level under SPS, it has to provide 
a scientific justification or risk assessment under Article 5 for such a measure. 
Scientific justification: according to the footnote of Article 3.3, a scientific justification is 
assumed if “on the basis of an examination and evaluation of available scientific 
information in conformity with the relevant provisions of this Agreement, a Member 
determines that the relevant international standards, guidelines or recommendations are 
not sufficient to achieve its appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection”162. 
The “relevant provisions” here mainly include Article 2.2 and Article 5.7. Article 2.2 
requires Members to maintain their measure with sufficient scientific evidence163 except 
as provided for in paragraph 7 of Article 5: 
In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member may 
provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures on the basis of available 
pertinent information, including that from the relevant international organizations 
as well as from sanitary or phytosanitary measures applied by other Members. In 
such circumstances, Member shall seek to obtain the additional information 
necessary for a more objective assessment of risk and review the sanitary or 
phytosanitary measure accordingly within a reasonable period of time.164 
                                                                                                                                                 
160 SPS, supra note 145, art. 3.3. 
161 See id. 
162 Id. n.2. 
163 See id. Art. 2.2. 
164 Id.  Art. 5.7. 
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This provision is usually considered as a reflection of the Precautionary Principle in 
WTO. In the EC Hormones case165 about an EC prohibition of imports of meat and meat 
products derived from cattle to which either the natural hormones or the synthetic 
hormones (“MGA”) were administered for growth promotion purposes, European 
Communities made an effort to use the Precautionary Principle directly as a defense for 
the prohibition in its appeal166. Though the Appellate Body concluded that the principle 
could not override the provisions under SPS, it showed an open mind in addressing the 
relation between the Precautionary Principle and Article 5.7 and other provisions under 
SPS. First, it affirmed that the Precautionary Principle is not only reflected in Article 5.7, 
and also in the paragraph 6 of the preamble and in Article 3.3.167 Then, it pointed out that 
a panel should, in the analysis of “sufficient scientific evidence”, “bear in mind that 
responsible, representative governments commonly act from perspectives of prudence 
and precaution where risks of irreversible, e.g. life-terminating, damage to human health 
are concerned”168. 
With these considerations, it is clear that Precautionary Principle does have a place in 
the SPS agreement and in addition, it is required as guidance for a panel to analyze 
relative cases under SPS. The only thing that you cannot do is to use Precautionary 
Principle itself as an absolute defense for your measure. As the Appellate Body 
concluded, the Precautionary Principle “does not, by itself, and without a clear textual 
directive to that effect, relieve a panel from the duty of applying the normal principles… 
                                                 
165 EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Report of the Appellate Body, 
WT/DS26&48/AB/R [herein after EC-Hormones] 
166 See id. para.16. 
167 See id. 
168 Id. 
 61
in reading the provisions of the SPS Agreement”169. This reasoning is desirable since the 
meaning and application of the Precautionary Principle need further authoritative 
formulation even in the field of international environmental law. And it is not reasonable 
to put such a burden on WTO, as an international trade organization.  
Risk assessment and the level of protection: a basic obligation of Members under SPS is 
to base their measures on a risk assessment, which is addressed in detail in Article 5170. 
Generally, in the assessment of risks, Members shall take into account scientific 
evidence171, economic factors172 and other relative factors, as well as the objective of 
minimizing negative trade effects173. For the level of protection to be appropriate, 
Members are required to avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions that result in 
discrimination or disguised trade restrictions on international trade174 and to ensure the 
measures are not more trade-restrictive than required175. And a measure is assumed not to 
be more trade-restrictive than required, unless there is another measure reasonably 
available, taking into account technical and economic feasibility to achieve the 
appropriate level of protection176. 
In the EC-hormones case above, the Appellate Body gave a rather flexible 
interpretation of Article 5 and its application: 
First, there is no quantitative requirement of risk. The Appellate body, against the 
panel’s finding, emphasized that there is no quantitative requirement of risk, such as “a 
minimum magnitude of risk” in risk assessment in the text of SPS. A panel is authorized 
                                                 
169 EC-Hormones, supra note 165, para.16. 
170 See SPS, supra note 145, art. 5.1-5.8. 
171 See id. Art. 5.2. 
172 See id. Art. 5.3. 
173 See id. Art. 5.4. 
174 See id. Art. 5.5. 
175 See id. Art. 5.6. 
176 See id. n.3. 
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only to determine whether an SPS measure is sufficiently supported or reasonably 
warranted by the risk assessment, not whether there is a demonstration of certain risk in 
the risk assessment.177 
Second, there is no procedural requirement for the risk assessment. The Appellate 
body rejected the panel’s requirement that the Member should actually take into account 
a risk assessment when it enacted or maintained the SPS measure, and concluded that the 
requirement of “basing on” under Article 5.1 is a substantive one, that there be a rational 
relationship between the measure and the risk assessment. Particularly, it pointed out that 
the Member does not have to carry out its own risk assessment. Rather, it can justify its 
SPS measure by a risk assessment carried out by another Member or international 
organization.178 
Third, there is no requirement of “mainstream” scientific opinion. According to the 
Appellate body report, Article 5.1 does not require that the risk assessment must 
necessarily embody only the view of a majority of the relevant scientific community. And 
the risk assessment can set out both the prevailing view as well as the opinions of 
scientists taking a divergent view and the existence of such divergence does not signal the 
absence of a reasonable relationship between the SPS measure and the risk assessment, 
especially where the risk is life-threatening. As a conclusion, the determination of the 
presence or absence of the relationship can only be done on a case-to-case basis.179 
Under such interpretation, to justify a SPS measure with a higher level of protection 
by a risk assessment, the Member does not have to do actually risk assessment by itself; 
does not have to show “identifiable risk” in the assessment, nor does the assessment have 
                                                 
177 See EC-Hormones, supra note 165, para.186. 
178 See id. para.188, 189, 190. 
179 See id. para.194.  
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to reflect any mainstream scientific opinion. All it has to do is, when such a measure is 
challenged before WTO and so required, to show the panel that there is a rational relation 
between the measure and the risk assessment. In addition, the Appellant Body, reversing 
the panel’s finding that the burden of proof under Article 3.3 was on European 
Communities, reaffirmed that the complaining party should have to bear the burden of 
proof at first under each Article of SPS, including Article 3.3.180 All these considerations 
above are more than enough to show that a Member’s right to adopt a higher SPS 
standard based on certain requirement of the SPS Agreement is substantively and 
procedurally protected to a great extent. 
TBT 
The substantial provision about the use of international standard and the exception is 
under Article2, paragraph 4: 
Where technical regulations are required and relevant international standards exist 
or their completion is imminent, Members shall use them, or the relevant parts of 
them, as a basis for their technical regulations except when such international 
standards or relevant parts would be an ineffective or inappropriate means for the 
fulfillment of the legitimate objective pursued, for instance because of 
fundamental climatic or geographical factors or fundamental technological 
problems.181 
The requirement for an exception here is less strict than the SPS Agreement. 
Members can have their own standard without the international standard as a basis as 
                                                 
180 See EC-Hormones, supra note 165, para.109. 
181 TBT, supra note 145, art. 2.4. 
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long as the international standards are “ineffective or inappropriate” for the fulfillment of 
the legitimate objective.     
So far there is only one case about TBT before DSB, the EC-Sardines case182, which 
mainly concerned a measure of European Communities prohibiting other species of 
sardines rather than the one called “sardine pilchardus walbaum” marketed in EC as 
preserved sardines183.  
The most important conclusion of the report of the Appellate Body in this case is 
about the burden of proof under Article 2.4184. The Appellate Body referring to the 
conclusion in the EC-hormones case, concluded that the complaining party, in this case, 
Peru bears the burden of proof. This means the member who complains about a given 
technical regulation or standard of another member not justified under Article 2.4 should 
provide evidence that the relevant international standard is “efficient” and “appropriate” 
to fulfill the legitimate objective of the claimed member. 
In addition, the Appellate Body gave some interpretation for the terms “legitimate 
objective”, “ineffective” and “inappropriate”185. For the term “legitimate objectives”, the 
Appellate Body reaffirmed the panel’s conclusion that it must cover  all the objectives 
explicitly mentioned in Article 2.3186, such as the protection of human health or safety, 
animal or plant life or health, or the environment and at the same time it extends beyond 
the list of Article 2.3.187 For the other two terms, the interpretation did not give much 
light and may need further address in the future. However,  with the conclusion about 
                                                 
182 European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines, the report of the Appellate Body, 
WT/DS231/AB/R [hereinafter EC-Sardines] 
183 See id. 1-4. 
184 See id. 269-282. 
185 See id. 285-286. 
186 See TBT, supra note 145, art. 2.3. 
187 See EC-Sardines, supra note 182, at 286. 
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burden of proof above and the flexibility compared to SPS of the language of TBT, we 
can expect a even broader interpretation of Article 2.4 and its application may be given in 
the near future.  
With the analysis of the SPS and TBT Agreements above, we can conclude that 1) 
there is no interference with the right of a member state itself to choose the level of 
protection it wants to adopt regarding its own natural resources, environmental quality, 
and the health and safety; 2) harmonization and the adoption of international standards 
are encouraged but not mandated; 3) only the measure chosen to implement these 
domestic policies will be subject to WTO review when they affect international trade, and 
the tests employed set an appropriate balance between the accommodation of national 
interests, on the one hand, and the need to police disguised trade restrictions, on the 
other.188     
4. NGOs’ participation: The transparency of WTO  
Non-Governmental Organizations have played an important role in the development 
of international environmental protection and even international environmental law. 
Compared to governmental organizations, NGOs have the following advantages:  
Technological advantage: the most powerful weapon of NGOs is the Internet, which 
provides a vast opportunity for sharing experiences and mobilizing activists to push for 
stronger environmental policies. With the control of Internet, NGOs make the once 
officially restricted information available to everyone with a computer, thus affect public 
opinion dramatically which forces policy-makers to think twice before any final decision. 
                                                 
188 This is the conclusion of most experts. See, e.g., Marsha A. Nichols, Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 191 (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1996). 
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Also, the rich and low-cost recourse of expertise and knowledge of NGOs provides 
analytical support for government officials in policy making.  
Monitoring and improving compliance and implementation: the enforcement of most 
international environmental agreements generally depends on national law and the 
member states’ self-report. On the one hand, NGOs can serve as a watchdog and increase 
the credibility of the relative reports by the governments, and, on the other, NGOs may 
provide technical, professional and even economic support to improve the governments’ 
capacity in implementing international agreements, especially those in developing 
countries. 
Sounding the Alarm: the technological advantage and, more important, the independent 
role of NGOs make NGOs more sensitive to any new potential threats to environment 
and public health without the twist from the political pressure.  
Recognizing these advantages of NGOs, some international environmental 
agreements have explicitly provided that NGOs could be invited as observers in the 
conferences of the parties. 
Here comes the question: should and will WTO, an international trade organization 
among governments devoted to promoting trade liberalization, welcome NGOs’ 
participation?  
One direct beneficiary of the NGOs’ participation is the Dispute Settlement Body of 
WTO. The members of the Panel or Appellate Body are mainly experts in the field of 
international trade, which may not be capable enough in disputes involving 
environmental considerations. With the advantages above, the NGOs’ participation will 
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increase the authority of DSB and make the report of the Panel or Appellate Body more 
acceptable to both the dispute parties and the publicity.  
More important, the participation of NGOs in the whole WTO regime will promote to 
a great extent the transparency and accountability of WTO. The unflattering and 
inaccurate portrait of the old GATT as a secretive cabal of “faceless bureaucrats”189 
painted by the environmental communities was largely due to the old GATT’s 
indifference to public participation and ignorance of the power of NGOs. For the new 
WTO, it is vital for the public to understand the aims of the WTO and to develop trust in 
this organization. As WTO requires transparency in the member states’ implementation 
of national trade law and decision-making, the transparency of WTO itself is and should 
be claimed too. Otherwise WTO would still be considered as some instrument with which 
big corporations hammer out deals secretly on the sacrifice of environmental interest and 
would suffer the same fate as its precedent. 
Fortunately, WTO seems to have learned the lesson from the old GATT and has 
attempted to welcome NGOs. Exactly at the time of its establishment, WTO has provided 
legal foundation for the NGOs’ participation in WTO:  
“The General Council may make appropriate arrangements for consultation and 
cooperation with non-governmental organizations concerned with matters related to those 
of the WTO.”190 
This provision has drawn a clear line between WTO and the old GATT. Under such a 
provision, whether NGOs can participate in WTO is no longer a question, but rather “in 
what forms of consultation and cooperation are appropriate.”191 
                                                 
189 See DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE FUTURE, Cha 2, at 55. 
190 See Documents Supp., supra note 33, Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art.5.2, at 
3. 
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Under this constitutional provision, WTO has made stable efforts towards more 
participation by NGOs, despite constant criticism from WTO governments against the 
involvement of NGOs192. Examples are informal sessions with NGOs by the Secretariat, 
the General Council’s permitting NGOs to attend the WTO Ministerial Conference, 
symposia sponsored by WTO with broad participation of NGOs and etc193. Recently the 
most important development may be the accepting of Amicus Reports under DSB:  
In the Shrimp-Turtle 1, the Panel received two documents called amicus briefs 
submitted by non-governmental organizations in the course of the proceedings. Holding 
that accepting non-governmental sources would be incompatible with the provisions of 
the DSU as currently applied, the Panel did not take the documents into consideration.194 
However, the Appellate Body reversed the findings, noting that accepting non-
governmental sources is not incompatible with the provisions of DSU. Rather, the panel 
and appellate body have the discretionary authority either to accept and consider or to 
reject information and advice submitted to it, whether requested or not, and “…that 
authority, and the breadth thereof, is indispensably necessary to enable a panel to 
discharge its duty imposed by Article 11 of the DSU to ‘make an objective assessment of 
the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the 
                                                                                                                                                 
191 Steve Charnovitz, Opening the WTO to Nongovernmental Interests, 24 FDMILJ 173, at 203. 
192 See id. 186-187 
193 See id. 181, 190. See also Report of the WTO Informal Sessions with Non-Governmental Organizations 
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194 See United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Production, Report of the Panel, 
WT/DS58/R, para.7.7, 7.8, May 15, 1998, [hereinafter Shrimp 1]  
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applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements….’”195 The 
Appellate body did accept three Amicus briefs attached to the submission of the United 
States as well as one brief from CIEL(Center for Marine Conservation and the Center for 
International Environmental Law).196 Though under such a finding, it’s still left to the 
Panel or the Appellate Body to decide whether to accept amicus briefs or not, the 
involvement of NGOs in WTO’s judicial function no doubt has been authorized. 
With all these substantive actions above, as well as an official webpage offering 
public access to full text of once-restricted WTO documents, from the basic WTO/GATT 
agreements, the decisions and reports of panel and Appellate Body to the new 
development of current WTO issues and a schedule of upcoming WTO events197, the 
transparency and accountability of WTO has been increasing. As a result, the first Global 
Accountability Report198 made by a group of experts from NGOs, universities and 
international institutions has given high marks to the WTO, ranking it third in access to 
online information, eighth on member control and fourth overall among 18 inter-
governmental organizations, transnational corporations and international NGOs. 
In conclusion, though NGOs’ participation in WTO is still in a limited and informal 
form, especially in its executive and legislative functions199, WTO’s sincerity and 
substantial efforts in inviting a broad public participation is undeniable and it should be 
trusted to be able to make further achievement in transparency and accountability.     
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Future issues 
1. Environmental Amendment to the TRIMs agreement  
Recognizing that restrictions on investors might impermissibly encourage the 
purchase of domestic over imported goods, the TRIMs200(Trade related Investment 
Measures) agreement was negotiated during the Uruguay Round to prohibit trade-related 
investment measures that conflict with Article III or Article XI of GATT. Certain 
domestic content restrictions and other restrictions on the ability of investors to import or 
export are illustrated in the annex to TRIMs201. But nothing in TRIMs refers to effect of 
global capital mobility on the environment. Though as discussed in the early part of this 
article, there is not enough empirical support for the race-to-the bottom argument that 
countries will be forced by the pressure from international competition to lower their 
environmental standards in order to attract more foreign direct investment, at least to 
decrease the hostility from environmentalists and show its concern of environmental 
interests in every aspect of its current structure, WTO should make an amendment to the  
TRIMs Agreement. A good model is Article 1114.2 of NAFTA: 
The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by relaxing 
domestic health, safety, or environmental measures. Accordingly, a Party should not 
waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, such 
measures as an encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, expansion, or retention 
in its territory of an investment of an investor. If a Party considers that anther Party has 
                                                 
200 See Documents Supp., supra note 30, Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, 170-173. 
201 See id. at 173.  
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offered such an encouragement, it may request consultations with the other Party and the 
two Parties shall consult with a view to avoiding any such encouragement.202 
The most acceptable point of this provision is that it doesn’t set up any substantive 
requirement for the standard of environmental protection in the host countries of FDI. 
Rather, it provides a legal foundation for the affected countries to complain when 
environmental laxity is used to attract investment. The addition of such a provision to the 
Agreement on TRIMs, combined with the efficient, authoritative dispute settlement of 
DSB under WTO, will eliminate the fear of a “race to the bottom” of environmentalists, 
guarantee an environmental-upward international investment flow, and may even 
contribute to a “race-to-the top” international trade. 
2. The potential trade-environment conflicts under TRIPS   
With the objective to reduce distortions and impediments to international trade and 
promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights, the Agreement 
on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)203 mainly addresses the 
applicability of basic GATT obligations such as MFN and national treatment, the 
principle of adequate intellectual property rights and the principle of effective 
enforcement measures for these rights.204 
Some potential trade-environment conflicts under the TRIPS have been noticed. One 
is about the relation between the protection of Patent and the right of indigenous people 
and the protection of traditional knowledge. Recently, with the emergence and 
                                                 
202 See Documents Supp., supra note 30, North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government 
of the United States of America, the Government of Canada and the Government of the United Mexican 
States, at 626. 
203 See Documents Supp., supra note 30, Annex 1C Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS), 335-366.  
204 See GATT Focus Newsletter, December 1993, at 12. 
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developing of an international biotechnology market and its observable profitability, 
developing countries with rich biodiversity have begun to claim their national 
sovereignty over their biodiversity resources and demand benefit sharing from the 
biotechnology developed, usually by developed countries. As a response to these claims, 
in its preamble, the parties of Convention on Biological Diversity205 (CBD) reaffirm 
states’ sovereignty over their own biological resources206 and recognize the desirability of 
sharing equitably the benefits arising from the use of traditional knowledge. What’s 
more, the Convention provides substantial obligation for the parties to “respect, preserve 
and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities 
embodying traditional lifestyles” related to biodiversity and “promote their wider 
application with the approval and involvement of the holders of such knowledge, 
innovations and practices and encourage the equitable sharing of the benefits arising from 
the utilization of such knowledge, innovations and practices”.207 
Though under the TRIPS agreement, members can, as a general principle, adopt 
measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition208 and provide limited 
exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent209 as long as they are consistent 
with the provisions of the Agreement, the plain language here fails to give us a clear 
expectation about how and to what extent special measures such as benefit sharing can be 
taken to protect the right of indigenous people. 
In the Doha ministerial conference, a declaration was adopted by ministers about the 
relation of the TRIPS Agreement and public health. The declaration agrees TRIPS 
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Agreement does not and should not prevent Members from taking measures to protect 
public health and reaffirms that flexibility provided in the Agreement should be fully 
used for this purpose. Particularly, it instructs the Council for TRIPS to find an 
expeditious solution to the problem about WTO members without sufficient or any 
manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector before the end of 2002. However, 
the Council failed to reach any conclusion before the deadline.210   
Another potential conflict is about the protection of intellectual property law and the 
requirement of technology transfer or support from developed countries to developing 
countries provided in many international environmental agreements. For example, the 
London Amendments in 1990 to the Montreal Protocol provide: 
Each Party shall take every practicable step, consistent with the programmes 
supported by the financial mechanism, to ensure: 
(a) That the best available environmentally safe substitutes 
and related technologies are expeditiously transferred to 
Parties operating under paragraph 1 of Article 5211; and  
(b) That the transfers referred to in subparagraph (a) occur 
under fair and most favourable conditions.212 
Though the TRIPS Agreement recognizes the special need of least-developed 
countries and gives an extended transition period to least developing countries of their 
obligations under the Agreement213, such advantage is very limited.  
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However, it should be noticed that the provisions about intellectual property rights or 
technology transfer in these international environmental agreements are themselves 
general rather than substantive and need further explanation. What is more, the potential 
conflicts above may be first of all a problem of law, including both Intellectual Property 
Law and International law (addressing the relation between different international 
agreements), rather than a problem of international trade. Before they are addressed in 
these two levels, WTO should not be expected to do more on these issues. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUSIONS   
In this article we discuss both the general relation between trade and environment and 
the resolution of specific trade and environment conflict in practice. What we can 
conclude here is there is no fundamental conflict between environmental protection and a 
multilateral trading system. Rather, trade liberalization and environmental protection 
should develop hand in hand towards the improvement of human welfare. In particular, 
WTO, as the leader of the trade regime, provide broad chances to accommodate 
environmental goals, including environment exceptions under Article XX of GATT, the 
SPS and TBT Agreements for the maintenance of high environmental standards, the 
participation of NGOs, and the flexibility provided by the Dispute Settlement Body in 
applying these environment-related trade rules. And WTO should be trusted to have the 
capacity and sincerity in resolving various current and potential trade and environment 
conflicts. The process of accommodation will be ongoing. At the same time, 
environmentalists should admit that environmental protection does not require the 
erection of new trade barriers and learn to work within the context of the legal framework 
for international trade to achieve their goals. At last, the opportunity to advance both 
environmental protection and trade liberalization under the overarching goal of 
sustainable development relies on both the international trade and environment regimes 
to facilitate cooperation and mutual support.    
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